The One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) project which aimed to give underprivileged children around the world a better chance at modern education may have been stifled though a combination of disinformation and other coordinated efforts by hardware and software monopolies that wanted to stop it.
The projects original goals were soon neglected, ultimately defeated, and then blame was passed to a scapegoat that was Free Software (GNU/Linux). Lets take a look at ways in which OLPC was derailed and why Free software was never the problem at all, as evidenced by its success in business, even outside the realms and shelter of a non-profit with goodwill and several sponsors.
In order to view this in from the right perspective, I'll also discuss an ongoing transformation of what companies often refer to as the desktop and why disruption plays a considerable role. This angle explains why existing monopolies battle against such change or when all else fails attempt to absorb that change, sometimes by means of devouring ones competition.
Some background: back in April, a major split in the OLPC project generated a lot of headlines. Precedence was given to Windows over GNU/Linux on the childrens laptops. It soon became a proprietary versus Free software debate. The split was characterized in the media as one that revolves around practicality, but there are other ways of approaching and analyzing this issue.
The debate is important for various reasons. Consider, for instance, recent success stories about low-cost GNU/Linux laptops from industry giants, along with the lessons they can teach us about OLPC, and vice versa. There are several commonalities worth exploring and myths that are worth busting. Free software and modern PCs increasingly enjoy a symbiotic relationship, so where and why did OLPC fail?
In recent months, spurred initially by OLPC (which in turn inspired low cost PC/hardware maker ASUSTeK, having received Intels endorsement), there has been this incoming wave of low-end laptops. Many of them are running the GNU/Linux operating system, which challenges existing cost barriers and offers some unique advantages.
The seminal and exceptionally successful move from ASUSTeK ignited many similar ones, more latterly from Dell and Acer, which even promised to focus on GNU/Linux. This so-called race to the bottom provides a valuable lesson about the merits of Free software in personal computing.
Similar rules apply to OLPC, so what ever went wrong? Why did OLPC partner with Microsoft at the end? More importantly, what would be the impact? In order to answer these questions, lets step aside for a moment and consider disruptive trends.
Personal computers are not just word processors and they are no longer terminals or workstations in the traditional sense. This is made ever more evident partly because a lot of processing gets done over the network nowadays. Our computers are not necessarily gaming machines either, especially since there is a game console-TV receiver convergence. Entertainment is often taken to the living room where there is greater interaction. The standalone fat client is aging and may soon become irrelevant.
Further to this, attempts are sometimes made to explain why affordable laptops are no longer capable of running the latest operating system from Microsoft, namely Windows Vista. Peoples expectations of computers and new patterns of their use, like Web-based applications, play a significant role here.
There are more different classes or tiers of personal computers these days. With PDAs, smartphones and pocket-sized PCs, people sometimes have more than a single PC. This observation is particularly important because adoption of small GNU/Linux laptops depends on it. Multi-purposeness makes a niche, an emerging market to address. The OLPC project needed such a gap for great expansion to be assured and for mass-production levels to be reached. Competition from Intel, however, stood in the way and there were other barriers.
Since its inception, OLPC has come under heavy criticism from some. There is a lot of disinformation suggesting that OLPCs vision was to raise children that engage in programming tasks. This is false and its also a means of distraction. It is a fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD) tactic that may or may not rely on deliberate misunderstanding.
The openness of program code and its accompanying rights is a question of control by an individual or a trusted capable peer, e.g. a fellow countryman who is ably trained to customize the software to better suit the needs of local schools, address requirements of individual classes of children, and contribute back the changes for everyone else to take advantage of. OLPC is an international and global-scale project, so this peer production cycle is an essential ingredient for its success. The project needs inertia that depends on software and hardware developers; it does not attempt to create or recruit any.
Another pattern of disinformation revolves around the user interface. A simplified desktop metaphor, Sugar, was used at the core of the OLPC XO, along with Fedora. It does not assume that one universal user interface should be tailored for every person or that all user interfaces should be created equal. It took into consideration the audience (children) and the key purpose (education). Sugar boldly takes a step further beyond what some adults are able to grasp due to their personal prior experience. This leads to antagonism and hostility.
The last noteworthy misconception involves the belief that developing nations will thrive in supply rather than self-sufficiency. If the projects goal is to only to provide tools that inspire and permit everyone to gain control, then there is no dependency. To an extent, OLPC has a lot to do with economical and technical autonomy. Its an enabler that liberates and potentially expands a local workforce.