Finding the Right Mix for Information Assurance

As security experts, we probably all have had the conversation about the

value of technical, operational and managerial security controls.

It usually goes something like this:

”My network (or system, or application) is very secure. Periodic

vulnerability scans are conducted, security patches are installed as

identified, and virus detectors are implemented. Additionally, there are

DMZs, firewalls, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), as well as

Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). Yep, we are totally secured. All that

other policy stuff does not matter.”

Then there’s this statement: ”We have all of the policies in place. We

have interpreted the national and agency policies into our language and

have the documents posted to our Website. Additionally, annual security

training is provided to the users and the system administrators. With all

these procedures and processes, how can we not be secure?”

And last, but not least, is the argument that if there is no support from

senior management on information assurance, and the associated

enforcement of the security policies, then the security program is doomed

to failure.

Personally, I always have believed all three need to be in place to have

a successful information assurance program. However, I hardly have ever

seen all three areas truly working together in the same environment.

What I have noticed is the three areas are at odds with one another.

After reading a couple of recent Government Accountability Office (GAO)

reports on the security posture of our government agencies, I have found

I am not the only one who has noticed a lack of interoperability between

the three security areas. For those of you who are not familiar with the

GAO, it’s an agency that works for Congress and the American people.

Congress will ask the GAO to study federal programs and expenditures in

an independent and nonpartisan manner. After an investigation, a report

is written that identifies areas of weaknesses and provides

recommendations to fix them.

One report in particular noted that the agency they were investigating

was particularly weak in the implementation of the managerial and

operational controls. Although the agency was diligent in periodic

scanning, patch management and the conduct of technical security feature

testing, the report noted that they did not track and plan for correction

of their non-technical deficiencies.

The GAO report identified several specific areas…

One of the areas was risk management. According to the GAO report, the

agency did not annually re-evaluate its network, system, and applications

to determine residual risks. This included activities such as the

security test and evaluation of the managerial and operational controls,

as well as the technical controls, and the tracking and corrections of

the non-technical findings.

This was particularly disturbing to me, as the determination of risk, and

then its minimization, is what information assurance is all about.

The other major trouble spot was a lack of security training and

awareness.

It’s not that a security training and awareness program did not exist,

because it does at this particular agency. The issue was that the

security training program was not maintained and updated to keep pace

with emerging security trends. There also was no good mechanism in place

to keep track of personnel who were trained.

There were other findings as well, but these were the major points.

I have to admit that none of these findings were a huge surprise, and

could probably be identified in any government agency at anytime. What

did surprise me was the agency’s response to the report.

Let me provide you a condensed version of the response: They periodically

execute vulnerability scans, respond to the identified vulnerabilities

and have other such technical controls in place. No mention of the

operational or managerial controls.

I have to admit I am amazed that with all the progress we have made in

the information assurance field, there could be such a lack of

understanding of how the three areas must work together. However, I am

hopeful that with the technical security features that are currently

available for our systems; the national attention that is being given to

security via policies (e.g., FISMA); and the enforcement of these

security policies that is slowly but steadily being executed, we may yet

get all three areas to interact in a positive manner.

Only then will our networks, systems and applications be truly secured.