Really? Based on what? Google's blog post?
Here are 10 reasons why Google Chrome OS isn't a Windows-smashing nuclear death blow:
So you've given up on Microsoft Office, and now use Google Docs full time, right? You've decided to use only online apps, and no desktop apps. No?
It took Google three years to reach 1 percent market share for Google Docs, its office suite. Many of those users -- probably most of them -- also use Microsoft Office or some other desktop operating system.
We can argue all day about whether people should use online apps, but the hard reality is that most people don't.
The choice between both desktop apps and online apps on the one hand, and online apps only on the other, has been offered to all users for years. I don't personally know anybody who has chosen the second option. Do you?
Google's proposition with Google OS is that people commit to using 100% web apps all the time, with no option to use desktop apps. The public has already rejected that proposition.
Google says the Google Chrome OS "should just work." But the Chrome browser doesn't "just work." Why should the OS?
Google has about 2% of browser market share. This percentage will rise. But in a direct competition between Microsoft's Internet Explorer, Mozilla's Firefox and Apple's Safari, Google Chrome is the least popular. Although IE is losing share, Firefox and Safari are gaining share, and faster than Chrome.
The screaming headlines are claiming, essentially, that an operating system based on a browser that 98% of users reject will "smash" an operating system that has enjoyed better than 90% share for over 15 years.
They're claiming that Google will be able to do what Apple, several Linux companies and countless startups have failed to do.
This would be more believable if Chrome had 98% browser market share. But it has 2%.
Every time some Silicon Valley giant comes along and proclaims a new era of applications delivered over a network, the tech press laps it up and spits it out as conventional wisdom.
In 1996, Oracle's Larry Ellison announced the "Network Computer" -- essentially a thin client that would "smash" the Windows monopoly, and deliver secure, fast, cheap computing over a network. The claimed benefits of the Network Computer were identical to what Google is claiming for the Chrome OS.
Obviously Ellison was wrong, and all those tech pundits who went along with Ellison's folly were wrong as well.
Since then, a large number of attempts have been made to offer apps over networks, and although some have gained limited traction for specific uses, none has made even a dent in the concept of a personal computer running local apps.
Even the (arguably) hottest app market in the world right now -- the market for iPhone and iPod Touch applications -- is dominated by apps you install locally.
One key assumption behind the idea that Chrome OS is a Windows killer is that Google is so good at everything that all they need to do is announce entry into a market and it's as good as theirs.
The truth is that Google fails to dominate most markets it enters. Sure, Google Search rules. And Gmail, Calendar, Earth, Maps and others are very successful as well. But what about Orkut, iGoogle, Reader, Profiles, Notebook, Lively, Writely, Dodgeball and others. These are all areas where Google tried to dominate, and failed. In fact, Google has hundreds of products, and very few of them lead their categories.
The Chrome OS initiative could be fantastic. But in the absence of evidence, there is no reason to assume Chrome OS will succeed just because Google is making it.
Google Chrome OS may motivate additional Web developers, but probably won't convince a whole lot of major, high-quality application, game and utility companies to devote enormous resources to the project.
The reason is that Google Chrome OS users will probably be motivated primarily by low price. These aren't users who are most likely to shell out real money for applications. That means the best app developers will keep writing for Windows, Mac OS and even other flavors of Linux. They'll go where the money is.