I don't know why this took so long, but it appears election officials around the nation are awakening to the fact that electronic voting machines are easily susceptible to tampering.
Brian Livingston wrote in this week's
Executive Tech column (
Fixing Elections for Fun and Profit) that two counties in Florida scrapped their e-voting machines made by Diebold Elections Systems "after computer experts showed that vote totals could be changed by a single individual in a way that would be undetectable later."
Now I read in
SiliconValley.com, via
Techdirt , that the secretary of state in California has refused to certify Diebold voting machines in 17 counties. In a letter to Diebold, an aide to the secretary of state cited "unresolved significant security concerns" about the memory cards used to store votes in each machine.
According to SiliconValley.com:
The Secretary of State's office is asking Diebold to submit the machine's source code for review by the federal Independent Testing Authorities before resubmitting the company's application for certification in California.
Diebold, which has a
history of refusing to share source code and then providing lame reasons for not doing so, says it will review the state's request. Why do I get the feeling the state's "request" will be rejected?
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